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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RALPH D. SLATER, dba 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS 
SERYICE, 
Appellatnt, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Cor-
poration, and L. C. CROWTHER, as 
Chief of Police of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7222 
This appeal is taken from an order of the Honor-
able A. H. Ellett, one of the Judges of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, sus-
taining respondents' demurrer to and dismissing appel-
lants' complaint, which complaint is set forth in full 
in appellant's brief on pages 2 to 12 thereof inclusive. 
Appellant's complaint sought to restrain respond-
ents from enforcing certain provisions of 'Section 3652 
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944, 
against himself and his agents. The pertinent parts of 
the said ordinance as it pertains to the case at bar reads 
as follows: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to peddle 
or offer for sale, barter or exchange at retail, any 
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2 
garden or farm produce, fruits, butter, eggs, 
poultry, fish, game, or any other goods, wares 
or merchandise whatsoever, or any tickets, cou-
pons or receipts representing value or redeemable 
in service, photographs, works of art, magazine 
subscriptions, goods or merchandise whatsoever, 
in, upon or along any street in Salt Lake City 
without first obtaining a license so to do. 
It shall be unlawful for any person, under 
any circumstances, to peddle, sell or offer for 
sale any magazine subscriptions, goods, wares or 
merchandise whatsoever, in, upon or along any 
of the following streets, to-wit: 
South Temple street from Second East street 
to First West Street ; First South street from 
Second East street to First West street; Second 
South street from Second East street to First 
West street; Third South street from Second 
East Street to First West street; Fourth South 
street from Second East street to First West 
street; State Street from First North street to 
Fifth South street; Main Street from First North 
street to Fifth South street; and no license shall 
be granted to any person to peddle in, upon or 
along the said streets above described.'' 
Appellant contends that the court erred in sustain-
ing the demurrer to and ordering the dismissal of his 
complaint substantially for the reason that Section 3652 
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944, 
is: 
1. An enfringement on the right of freedom of 
speech and of the press. 
2. A burden upon inter-state commerce. 
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3. Yoid because of discrimination. 
And for the further reason that respondents were 
discriininatory in enforcing the provisions of said ordi-
nance. 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
It is respondents' position that appellant did not 
set forth facts sufficient in his complaint on file herein 
to warrant the trial court granting the relief therein 
prayed for and that the trial court was justified 
in entering its order sustaining respondents' demurrer 
and ordering the dismissal of appellant's complaint. 
This appeal is on the judgment roll only. However, the 
trial court did prepare and file a memorandum decision 
which is a part of this judgment roll. 
Respondents in advancing their position in the fore-
going matter and in answer to appellant's brief hereto-
fore filed with your Honorable Court herein sets forth 
their argument under five points, ,each of which will be 
set forth separately as follows: 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
I. THE CITY HAS POWER AND THE DUTY 
TO ENACT ORDINANCES REGULATING SALES 
ON ITS HIGHWAYS AND SIDEWALKS. 
II. THE RESTRICTION BY THE CITY ORDI-
NANCE OF SALES IN A CONGESTED BUSINESS 
AREA IS NOT AN INFRINGEMENT ON THE 
RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE 
PRESS. 
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III. THE RESTRICTION OF A CERTAIN 
AREA FROM THE BUSINESS OF THE SALE OF 
MAGAZINES FOR PRIVATE GAIN IS NOT A BUR-
DEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
IV. SECTION 3652 OF THE REVISED ORDI-
NANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1944, IS 
NOT VOID FOR WANT OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIM-
INATION OR PROPER AND LAWFUL CLASSIFI-
CATION. 
V. THE MERE LAX ENFORCEMENT OF SEC-
TION 3652 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1944, BY RESPONDENTS 
IS NOT A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION IN 
A CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CITY HAS POWER AND THE DUTY 
TO ENACT ORDINANCES REGULATING SALES 
ON ITS HIGHWAYS AND SIDEWALKS. 
The State of Utah has del ega ted to cities the power 
to regulate sales and the movement of pedestrians on 
its streets and sidewalks. Some of these grants by the 
state to cities are as follows: 
"15-8-29. TRAFFICKING IN STREETS. 
They may regulate merchandising and sales upon 
the streets, sidewalks and public places.'' U.C.A. 
1943. 
"15-8-30. REGULATION OF TRAFFIC. 
They may regulate the movement of traffic on the 
streets, sidewalks and public places, including the 
movement of pedestrians as well as of vehicles, 
and the cars and engines of railroads, street rail-
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immoderate driving or riding.'' U.C.A. 1943. 
'' 15-8-11. STREETS-ENCROACHMENTS, 
LIGHTING, SPRINKLING, CLEANING. They 
Inay regulate the use of streets, alleys, avenues, 
sidewalks, crosswalks, parks and public grounds, 
prevent and remove obstructions and encroach-
ments thereon, and provide for the lighting, 
sprinkling and cleaning of the same.'' U. C.A. 
1943. 
"15-8-23. C LEA N IN G PROPERTY, 
STREETS AND SIDEWALKS. They may regu-
late and control the use of sidewalks and all struc-
tures thereunder or thereover; and they may re-
quire the owner or occupant, or the agent of any 
owner or occupant, of property to remove all 
weeds and noxious vegetation from such property, 
and in front thereof to the curb line of the street, 
and to keep the sidewalks in front of such prop-
erty free from litter, snow, ice and obstructions." 
U.C.A. 1943. 
'' 15-8-39. LICENSE OF CERTAIN BUSI-
NESSES. They may license, tax and regulate 
hawking and peddling, etc. * * * U.C.A. 1943. 
"15-8-80. LICENSE FEES AND TAXES. 
They may raise revenue by levying and collecting 
a license fee or tax on any business within the 
limits of the city, and regulate the same by ordi-
nance, etc." U.C.A. 1943. 
''15-8-84. ORDINANCES-PUNISH11:ENT. 
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make 
all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary 
for carrying into effect or discharging all powers 
and duties conferred by this chapter, and such 
as are necessary and proper to provide for the 
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6 
safety and preserve the health, and promote the 
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good 
order, comfort and convenients of the city and 
the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of 
property therein; etc.'' U.C.A. 1943. 
It is evident from the foregoing grants of power 
that cities have the power to adopt ordinances tending 
to promote the general welfare of the public and the 
use of its streets and sidewalks and the right to regulate 
the business of sales for personal gain upon its streets 
and sidewalks and public places. These powers ipso 
facto carry with them the authority not only to impose 
reasonable restrictions and regulations but even the 
power to suppress sales thereon. People vs. Thomvp~Son, 
173 N. E.137. 
In the case of Wade v. City arn.d Oounty of Swn 
Francisco, 186 Pac. 2d, 181, the court said "that an ordi-
nance prohibiting solicitation on any public street or 
highway or in any area or doorway or entrance imme-
diately abutting thereon of magazine subscriptions for 
future delivery is prima facie constitutional.'' 
It is the duty of the city to maintain its streets in 
such condition that the public should at all times have 
the unobstructed use thereof. People v. Corn Products 
Bejinimg Co., 121 N. E. 574. 
The city holds title to our public streets in trust for 
the use and benefit of the public and the public is ,en-
titled to use such streets free of obstructions. City of 
Chicag(o v. McKitnley, 176 N. E. 261. 
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II. THE RESTRICTION BY THE CITY ORDI-
1\AXCE OF SALES IN A CONGESTED BUSINESS 
AREA IS NOT AN INFRINGEMENT ON THE 
RIGHT OF FREEDO:JI OF SPEECH AND OF THE 
PRESS. 
The respondents have no quarrel with the statement 
made by appellant that ''the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press have been secured by the constitutions of the 
United States and of the State of Utah.'' 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled many 
times upon questions involving these provisions in the 
constitutions. Appellant relies in his brief upon the 
decisions handed down in the case of Schtneider v. lrv-
itngton, 308 U. S. 147, 84 L. Ed. 155, and also recite in 
support of his position the cases of Lovell v. City iof 
Griffin, 303 U. 'S. 444, and H·ague v. 0. I. 0., 307 U. S. 
496, 83 L. Ed. 1423. 
These are all cases where religion or a private con-
troversy were being aired publicly by the distribution of 
leaflets or printed mater and where ordinances were in 
force that required the obtaining of a permit before any 
such printed matter could be distributed, or where there 
were provisions to the effect that such leaflets could not 
be thrown upon the public streets or where the chief of 
police was delegated unlimited discretion to determine 
who might or who might not distribute such printed 
matter. 
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The cases are well settled that where a question of 
religion or a private controversy are being presented 
by printed or spoken word the same may be distributed 
or spoken in all public places including streets and side-
walks, subject only to any and all reasonable regulations 
by the local authorities. 
The cases are also unanimously in accord that no 
person has . any inherent right to conduct or carry on a 
private business for his personal gain in a public street 
and that such private business for gain is at all times 
subject to local regulation or complete suppression de-
pendent upon the local needs or requirements. This also 
extends to the selling of magazines or other printed mat-
ter upon a public street as a matter of private gain or 
business. 
There can be no doubt from the allegations of ap-
pellant's complaint that he was engaging in business for 
private gain on the public streets of Salt Lake City for 
paragraphs 8, 9 and 15 of plaintiff's complaint provide 
in part as follows: 
'' 8. Plaintiff now is and has been, engaged 
on the public streets and sidewalks in said Salt 
Lake City, and in areas, doorways and entrance-
ways immediately abutting thereon, in the busi-
ness of soliciting and selling, in a quiet, dignified 
and peaceful manner, without pressure or undue 
influence, by and through agents and employees 
employed by him for the purpose of selling, to 
persons on said places, subscriptions to the maga-
zines and periodicals aforesaid, for future de-
livery, and ·likewise the sale of tangible personal 
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property to be delivered to the purchasers there-
of, or to some other person, at a subsequent time.'' 
"9. • • • in said Salt Lake City, the defend-
ants herein, acting by and through police officers 
of the defendant municipality, and for the pur-
pose of preventing plaintiff from so soliciting, 
by and through his agents and employees, sales of 
such subscriptions and sales of such tangible per-
sonal property, arrested certain of plaintiff's said 
agents and employees for alleged violations of 
said ordinance, * * * continue to prevent, plain-
tiff from carrying on in the manner aforesaid his 
said business in said Salt Lake City, all to plain-
tiff's great pecuniary damage and irreparable 
loss.'' 
'' 15. The defendants will, unless restrained 
by this court, enforce the said ordinance against 
plaintiff and his said agents and representatives 
and will thereby injure and destroy the plaintiff's 
said property and property rights, and cause 
them material and irreparable loss, and plain-
tiff will be unable to conduct their said business 
in Salt Lake City. The matter in controversy ex-
ceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, many thous-
ands of dollars. The value of the right of plain-
tiff to carry on his said business, free from the 
harrassing and unlawful acts threatened by de-
fendants as alleged hereinbefore, exceeds many 
thousands of dollars. '' 
In the case of Schn;ei,der v. I rvingbon, sup,ra, the 
court said at page 163, where referring to the ordinance 
then under attack: 
"The ordinance is not limited to those who 
canvass for private profit; nor is it merely the 
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common type of ordinance requiring some form of 
registration or license of hawkers or peddlers. It 
is not a general ordinance to prohibit trespassing. 
It bans unlicensed communication of any views 
or the advocacy of any cause from door to door, 
and permits canvassing only subject to the power 
of a police officer to determine, as a censor, what 
literature may be distributed from house to house 
and who may distribute it.'' 
The same court further on page 165 states : 
"We are not to be taken as holding that com-
mercial soliciting and canvassing may not be sub-
jected to such regulation as the ordinances re-
quires.'' 
The latest United States Supreme Court case de-
cided on the question of freedom of the press and free-
dom of speech is perhaps the case of Baia v. Pe1ovple, 
decided on June 7, 1948, and reported in 68 Sup. Ct. 
1148, a 5 to 4 decision in which the court held a city 
ordinance void which permitted sound trucks to operate 
in public places only if they first obtained a permit from 
the chief of police, the court saying in part with refer-
ence to said ordinance that the said ordinance was void 
for the reason that it provided for no standards pre-
scribed for the exercise of the chief of police's discretion 
and that the ordinance was not narrowly drawn to reg-
ulate the hours or places of use of loud-speakers or the 
volume of sound to which they must be adjusted. The 
Saia ease is a case involving the use of a sound truck 
for religious purposes and even under such conditions 
the court infers that an ordinance would be valid regu-
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lating· freed01n of speech and religion by controlling the 
hours and the place of discussion permitted and the 
an10un t of sound allowed. 
On ~-\pril13, 1942, the United States Supreme Court 
sustained an absolute prohibition of commercial adver-
tising on city streets in the case of ralentine vs. Chrest-
en.sen, 316 U. S. 3:2, 96 L. Ed. 1262. In that case a regu-
lation of the City of New York prohibited the distribu-
tion of commercial handbills on the public streets. The 
court upheld such measure as a valid exercise of the 
city's police power, declaring that it did not interfere 
with the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by 
the Federal Constitution; and stated: 
''This court has unequivocally held that the 
streets are proper places for the exercise of the 
freedom of communicating information and dis-
seminating opinion and that, though the states 
and municipalities may appropriately regulate the 
privilege in the public interest, they may not un-
duly burden or proscribe its employment in these 
public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that 
the Constitution imposes no such restraint on gov-
ernment as respects purely commercial advertis-
ing. Whether, and to what extent, one may pro-
mote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, 
to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a 
derogation of the public right of user, are matters 
for legislative judgment. The question is not 
whether the legislative body may interfere with 
the harmless pursuit of a lawful business, but 
whether it must permit such pursuit by what it 
deems an undesirable invasion of, or interference 
with, the full and free use of the highways by the 
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people in fulfillment of the public use to which 
streets are dedicated. If the respondent was at-
tempting to use the streets of New York by dis-
tributing commercial advertising, the prohibition 
of the code provision was lawfully invoked against 
his conduct.'' 
It should also be noted that the case of Valentine vs. 
Chrestensen, supra, carne after the decisions of Oantwell 
v. Oownecticut, 310 U.S. 305, 84 L. Ed. 1213, LoueU and 
Hague cases supra. So, there is a clear indication that 
the freedom of the press and speech guarantees of the 
Constitution apply to non-commercial activities only. 
The Supreme Court has also said in the case of 
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 77 L. Ed. 288: 
"It is well established law that the highways 
of the State are public property-that their use 
for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, 
which, generally, at least, the state may prohibit 
or condition as it sees fit.'' 
In the case of City of Chioago v. Rhine, 2 N. E. 2d 
905, a case directly in point, and in which case the sell-
ing of magazines as a business was prohibited in cer-
tain congested districts and an objection was raised 
that the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of 
the press was violated by such restriction, the court 
said at page 909 : 
''The defendant has not been deprived of 
any supposed right freely to sell any magazines 
which are written or published on any subject. 
The ordinance has merely regula ted his business 
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of BUlking ~ale~ on the ~treets in eertain restricted 
regions in the city. His business has not been sup-
pressed. The business of all others in a like situa-
tion and like business has been equally regulated. 
Such regulation does not run against the grain of 
the constitution. The ordinance does not prohibit 
the sale nor the offering for sale of any maga-
zines or any like publications in the city nor in-
terfere with the circulation thereof." (Cites 
cases) 
III. THE RESTRICTION OF CERTAIN AREAS 
FROi\I THE BUSINESS OF THE SALE OF MAG-
AZINES FOR PRIVATE .GAIN IS NOT A BURDEN 
ON INTER-STATE COMMERCE. 
Appellant in his brief under point II of his argu-
ment cites several cases holding that cities do not have 
the power to license or tax inter-state commerce; no-
where in appellant's complaint does he allege that the 
city did or attempted to exact a license or tax from him 
for the privilege of engaging in any interstate business 
or commerce. As a matter of fact Section 3722 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944, as 
amended, specifically exempts any persons engaging in 
inter-stale business from procuring a license from the 
city to so engage in such business. In the laS't paragraph 
under point II of appellant's argument he says: 
"In the case at bar the agent is pro:P,ibited 
from soliciting business within a large section of 
the city by this ordinance and therefore such re-
striction limits the free flow of business between 
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the states and that area and is a burden upon in-
terstate commerce.'' 
Under its police power a city has a right to make 
reasonable regulations for the conduct of any business 
for the purpose of promoting the peace, health and pros-
perity. of its citizens. 
In the case of Town of Green Rive.r v. Bwnger, 58 
Pac. 2d 456, which case was appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court, in 300 U. S. 638, 81 L. Ed. 854, 
a city ordinance provided that it was unlawful to make 
a solicitation at any residence within the city for the 
purpose of obtaining orders for the sale of goods, wares 
and merchandise without first being invited by the occu-
pant of such residence to make such solicitation. A 
solicitor was arrested for such offense and the validity 
of the ordinance was attacked on the grounds that it 
was a burden on inter-state commerce by restricting the 
places that could be solicited, but the court held the 
ordinance valid, and stated at page 463 : 
''We have in this case no question of the 
exaction of a license fee or a tax. The ordinance 
clearly is a local police regulation. We have de-
cided that it has a real relation to the suitable 
protection of people in their homes, and is reason-
able in its requirements. If we are right in our 
views as to the purpose and reasonableness of the 
ordinance, it is valid, even though it may in-
cidentally affect interstate commerce. Both fed-
eral courts that considered the ordinance were of 
the same opinion on that question. Fuller Brush 
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Co. Y. Town of Green River, 60 Fed. 613, and 
Town of Green RiYer Y. Fuller Brush Co., 65 
Fed. 2d 112. 88 A\.L.R. 177. The Circuit Court of 
Appeals said: 'The ordinance does not purport 
to interfere in any respect with the Fuller Brush 
Company· s right or privilege of selling and trans-
porting its ·wares in interstate commerce. It is 
free to carry on a business of that sort except to 
solicit orders in the manner specified in the or-
dinance, and obviously it could do so in many 
"¥ays other than imposing itself upon and dis-
turbing the residents of the town as prohibited by 
the ordinance'." 
In the case of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 
Fed. 2d 112, the court said : 
''It has been uniformly held that while legis-
lative authority may not arbitrarily interfere with 
private affairs by imposing unusual and unneces-
sary restrictions upon a lawful business, yet a 
considerable latitude of discretion must be ac-
corded to the law making power, and if the regu-
lation operates uniformly upon all persons simi-
larly situated and it is not shown that it is clearly 
unreasonable and arbitrary, it cannot be judicially 
declared to be in contravention of constitutional 
right. 
''This court has frequently affirmed that the 
local authorities intrusted with the regulation of 
such matters, and not the courts, are primarily 
the judges of the necessities of local situations 
calling for such legislation, and the courts may 
only interfere with laws or ordinances passed 
in pursuance of the police power where they are 
so arbitrary as to be palpably and unmistakably 
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in excess of any reasonable exercise of the author-
ity conferred.'' 
And in further holding that the restrictions imposed 
by local law did not interfere with interstate commerce 
stated: 
''Public notice of the presence of its agents in 
the town for the purpose of taking orders for 
appellee's goods could be given stating when and 
where such agents could be found, samples of its 
wares seen, and their use explained and demon-
strated, and orders taken.'' 
Also see Packer Corporation v. St,ate of Utah, 285 
U.S. 52. 
In the case of Savage v. Janes, 225 U.S. 501, 56 
L. Ed. 1182, the court said : 
''The state cannot, under cover of exerting its 
police powers, undertake what amounts essential-
ly to a regulation of interstate commerce, or im-
pose a direct burden upon that commerce. But 
when the local police regulation has real relation 
to the suitable protection of the people of the 
state, and is reasonable in its requirements, it is 
not invalid because it may incidentally affect in-
terstate commerce.'' 
In the case of Internatiowal Text Book Oo. v. City 
of Auburn, 155 Fed. 986, the court said: 
''An ordinance prohibiting the distribution 
of handbills, etc., in the public streets on the 
ground, among others, that it controlled annoy-
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ing methods of interfering with persons travel-
ing therein, is valid and should be upheld. Laws 
prescribing a punishment for those who engage 
in the temporary business of vending within a 
certain distance of camp meetings or fairs with-
out the consent of those in charge of the said 
meetings or fairs have been sustained as reason-
able police regulations on the ground that they 
are intended to prevent disturbances.'' State v. 
Reynolds, 58 Atl. 755~ )!eyers v. Baker, 12 N. E. 
79. 
In the case of Commi.ssion v. Gardner, 19 Atl. 554, 
148 U.S. 774, the court upheld the validity of a statute 
prohibiting the sale of foreign and domestic goods, wares 
and merchandise in a specified county by any person 
or persons as hawker or peddler, the court reasoning 
that there can be no interference with inter-state com-
merce by legislation which erects no barrier at the state 
line, such regulation being merely a police regulation 
applicable to all persons whether non-residents or not. 
In the case of Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79, 
54 L. Ed. 673, the court upheld the validity of a state 
law prohibiting drumming and soliciting business for 
patronage upon railroad trains and premises of common 
carriers. Also see Ex. Parte Hogg, 156 S. W. 931. 
IV. SECTION 3652 OF THE REVISED ORDI-
NANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1944, IS 
NOT VOID FOR WANT OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIM-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
!NATION OR PROPER AND LAWFUL CLASSIFI-
CATION. 
Appellant takes the position that because the city 
permits the sale of newspapers upon the str.eets within 
the district in which the subscription to magazines is 
prohibited by ordinance, ·the said ordinance is arbitrary, 
capricious and provides for unlawful classification. The 
Utah Supreme Court has passed upon the question of 
proper and permitted classification in the case of Br>o,ad-
b.ent, 1et. al. v. Gibson, a Utah case, 140 Pac. 2d 939. 
In determining whether or not this classification is 
unconstitutional, it must be remembered that discrimin-
ation is the very essence of classification and is not ob-
jectionable unless founded upon distinetions which the 
court is compelled to find unreasonable. St,ate v. Mason, 
94 Utah 501. 78 Pac. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R. 330. 
The legislature has a wide discretion in determining 
what shall come within the class of permitted activities 
and what shall be excluded. Kolman v. St. Lo~uis, 289 
S. W. 838; Stewart Uotor Co. v. Oity of Omaha, 235 
N.W. 332; State v. Dolmw, 13 Ida. 693, 92 Pac. 995. 
The court is not concerned with the wisdom or 
policy of the law and cannot substitute its judgment for 
·that of the legislative body. If reasonable minds might 
differ as to reasonableness of the regulation, the law 
must be upheld. Niebbia v. People, 291 U.S. 502, 78 L. 
Ed. 940. 
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The Illinois Supreme Court has passed directly on 
this question in the case of Oi'ty of Chicago v. Rhirne, 
supra., a 1936 cas.e in which case the court said in dis-
cussing the objections to permitting the sale of news-
papers and prohibiting ·the sale of magazines within a 
restricted district and the lack of reason in establishing 
restricted zones : 
"The defendant contends that the ordinance 
is unreasonable in that (1) there is no sufficient 
legal reason why the ordinance should permit the 
sale of daily newspapers and prohibit the sale of 
magazines within the restricted territory; and 
(2) that there is no substantial basis for designat-
ing either of the two prohibited areas in which 
commerce cannot be carried on freely. 
(7) It is a matter of common knowledge that 
the loop and the Wilson avenue districts are 
severally highly congested areas for travel and 
transportation, and of this fact we take judicial 
notice. 23 Corpus Juris, Sec. 1992, p. 165. It doubt-
less was the thought of the municipal authorities 
that the indiscriminate sale of articles of mer-
chandise upon the streets in the prohibited ter-
ritory tended to impede, delay, and obstruct traf-
fic, thereby impairing the legitimate use of the 
streets. The hampering of traffic movement in 
the congested areas was a problem presented to 
the municipal authorities for solution. They were 
not concerned with the fact that withdrawal of the 
use of such streets for private gain by street 
vendors and peddlers might possibly work a 
hardship in individual cases on those engaged in 
such commercial pursuits, but realizing it was the 
city's obligation to arrive at, as nearly as might 
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be, a practical remedy for the relief of the unfav-
orable travel situation in those streets, overbur-
dened with traffic, the municipal authorities de-
termined upon this ordinance as an appropriate 
legal remedy. 
(8-11) It is our duty in passing upon the 
reasonableness of the ordinance to consider the 
circumstances and conditions existing at the time 
of its passage and the evils sought to be cor-
rected. Biffer v. City of Chicago, supra. Even 
though we might not agree with the judgment of 
the municipal body in the passage of such ordi-
nance and think it oppressive, yet if it was with-
in the powers granted the municipality we have 
no right to disturb the ordinance (Metropolis 
Theater Co. v. City of Chi,cago, 246 Ill. 20, 92 
N. E. 597, affirmed in 228 U. S. 61, 33 S. Ct. 441, 
57 L. Ed. 730) unless it is clearly unreasonable. 
City of Chicago v. Clark, 359 Ill. 37 4, 194 N. E. 
537. It is not within the province of the judiciary 
to set up its judgment as to the necessity and 
appropriateness of the legislative act so long as 
the same may not clearly be unreasonable. Fer-
guson Coal Co. v. Thompson, supra; Dorwart v. 
City of Jacksonville, 333 Ill. 143,164 N.E.129; 
Melton v. City of Paris, 333 Ill. 190, 164 N. E. 
218. Under the special circumstances existing in 
the loop and the Wilson avenue areas it was not 
necessary that the ordinance apply to all portions 
of the city. City of Chicago v. McKinley, supra; 
Ferguson Coal Co. v. Thompson, supra; Com-
monwealth v. Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57, 30 N. E. 
79; People v. Keir, 78 Mich. 98, 43 N. W. 1039. 
(12, 13) The defendant earnestly insists 
that because the ordinance permits the sale of 
daily newspapers within the prohibited districts 
the ordinance is thereby unconstitutional. In 
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taking up this phase of the case we should glance 
for the moment at the position of the defendant 
who is attarking the ronstitutionality of the ordi-
nance. He is seeking to carry out his own private 
commercial enterprise for his own personal finan-
cial profit, on the streets within the loop district, 
one of the forbidden domains. Although he may 
haYe, prior to the passage of the ordinance, pur-
sued his calling on the streets, his use thereof 
was solely a permissive one. He had no inherent 
right to operate his business in or upon the streets 
of the city. People v. Thompson, supra; People 
v. \V olper, 350 Ill. 461, 183 N. E. 451; People v. 
Clean Street Co., 225 Ill. 479, 80 N. E. 298, 9 
L. R. A. (N.S.) 455, 116 Am. St. Rep. 156; Wade 
v. Nunnelly, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 256, 46 S. W. 668; 
Rosa v. City of Portland, 86 Or. 438, 168 P. 936, 
L. R. A. 1918 B, 851; Greene v. City of San An-
tonio (Tex. Civ. App.) 178 S. 'W. 6; West v. City 
of Waco, 116 Tex. 472, 294 S. W. 832. That some 
one else is given the privilege of selling news-
papers (a commodity not within the same class 
as the article the defendant was exposing for and 
offering for sale) did not constitute an uncon-
stitutional discrimination against him. The class-
ification made by the city by which daily news-
papers were exempt from the operation of the 
ordinance was valid. People v. Thompson, supra; 
Rosa v. City of Portland, supra; Philadelphia v. 
Brabender, 201 Pa. 574, 51 A. 374, 58 L. R. A. 220. 
(14, 15) Nor does the ordinance run coun-
ter to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States nor to the cited sections 
of the State Constitution. The ordinance affected 
all persons engaged in the same business equally 
under like conditions. Churchill v. Albany, 65 
Or. 442, 133 P. 632, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 1094. Nor 
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did the ordinance offend against the equality pro-
vision of the Constitution. The equality of en-
joyment is not within the constitutional guaranty. 
Such guaranty does not mean that a legislative 
act will operate alike upon all citizens. The equal-
ity of right is the equality guaranty." 
The case of Rosa v. City of Portland, 168 Pac. 936, 
held that a city ordinance imposing license taxes on 
peddlers in the city streets except venders of newspapers, 
farm produce, etc., does not deprive dealers in popcorn, 
fruits, etc., of any privileg.e or immunity in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion, since the right to use city streets is not inherent 
but may be limited or prohibited. 
Also see People v. Finkelst.ein, 9 N. Y. Sup. 2d 941, 
wherein it was held that newspapers and magazines 
were a proper classification as against other merchan-
dise. 
It should also be noted that the case of City of Chi-
cago v. Rhine, sup.na, as does the weight of authority, 
provide that the court may take judicial notice of the 
congested district or districts within the city. 
V. THE MERE LAX ENFORCEMENT OF SEC-
TION H652 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1944, BY RESPONDENTS 
IS NOT A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION IN 
A CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE. 
It was admitted by respondents in the hearing on 
demurrer that the ordinance was not enforced against 
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the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses in the distribu-
tion or sale of religious literature, the great weight of 
authority being to the effect that cities do not have the 
power or right to prohibit or suppress the distribution 
or sale of religious literature upon its streets or in public 
places, but does have the power to impose reasonable 
regulations thereon. 
In the case of City .of Blue Island v. Kozul, 41 N. E. 
2d 515, the court held that a ci·ty ordinance requiring 
peddlers selling or offering for sale goods, wares or 
merchandise to obtain a license and paying license fees 
as applied to sale and distribution of magazines and 
leaflets by a member of Jehovah's Witnesses who dis-
tributed the literature as part of her form of worship 
without financial gain or material profit to herself and 
not as a means of livelihood is unconstitutional and a 
violation of the right of freedom of speech and of free-
dom of the press. The Rhine case, supr:a, was ref·erred 
to and pointed out as an exception to the rule in this 
case and the case of Schneider v. Irving~~on, supr:a. 
The case of Hamnan vs. Oity of Haverhill, 120 Fed. 
2d 87, was a case involving distribution of books and 
leaflets by Jehovah's Witnesses on the city streets and 
the court held : 
''The constitutional liberties of a citizen to 
use streets for purposes of assembly and the in-
terchange of thought on religious, political and 
other matters are relative not absolute and must 
be exercised in subordination to the comfort and 
convenience and in consonance with peace and 
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good order. A state or municipality may by gen-
eral and not non-discriminatory legislation regu-
late the times, places and manner of soliciting 
upon its streets and of holding meetings thereon 
and may, in other respects, safeguard the peace, 
good order and comfort of the community without 
unconstitutional liberties protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment, but the regulations must be 
appropriate to subject matter regulated.'' 
Also see 175 S. W. 2d 21. Also see Saia v. People 
of the State of New York, supra, a case involving the 
use of a loud speaker in public places by Jehovah's 
Witnesses. 
All of the above cases establish the rule that the 
distributing or selling religious literature is not in the 
sam.e class as the selling of magazines or books as a 
private business for personal gain and that a different 
rule exists for each. The city of Salt Lake City has 
heretofore arrested members of the Jehovah's Witnesses' 
religious sect for distributing their literature and other 
publications and selling the sam·e on our public streets 
and the trial courts have repeatedly held that the city's 
power with relation to such religious sects is merely 
that of regulation and not of suppression as is the rule 
with a private business being conducted on a public 
street for personal gain. Nor does appellant contend in 
support of his position that the city permits other mag-
azine salesmen, who sell for private gain, or salesmen 
who sell other commodities within the same class as 
magazines for private gain, to sell their magazines, wares 
or other commodities upon the public streets of Salt 
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Lake City with impunity, while at the same time prose-
cuting appellant for such activity. 
The city at the time of the hearing on demurre·r, 
for the purpose of argument, admitted the sale of tickets 
to centennial events such as rodeos and musicals from 
a booth located at 2nd South and Main Str·eets in Salt 
Lake City, but contended and does again contend that 
such activities are not in the same class as selling mag-
azines or goods, wares or merchandise, the sale of which 
are prohibited by the provisions of Section 3652 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944, and 
that such exceptions as are made in said ordinance are 
proper classifications within the power of the city legis-
lative body to create and establish by ordinance, based 
on the existing facts then before and considered by them 
at the time of adopting such ordinance. 
Let us assume, however, for the purpose of argu-
ment that the appellant is right in his contention that 
the city has been lax in the enforcement of certain pro-
visions of Section 3652 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944. 
The cases cited by him such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 30 L. Ed. 220; Glicke.r v. Michigan Liquor 
Control Commiss!ion, 160 Fed. 2d 96, ar.e not in point 
for they are cases where a discretion was delegated to 
city officials by ordinance in granting or denying a 
license to do business and in each case the court held 
that an arbitrary refusal to grant the license to '"'""one 
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person when it was granted to others in like positions 
and under similar circumstances was a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 
The case of Wade v. City and County of 8wn. Fran-
cisco, 186 Pac. 2d 181, holds that the city in that case 
was deliberately and intentionally permitting some to 
sell magazine subscriptions while prohibiting others from 
selling magazine subscriptions in the same places and 
under similar circumstances. 
Appellant made no allegations in his complaint al-
leging that the city was intentionally or deliberately 
permitting others to sell or solicit the sale of magazines 
for personal gain in the r-estricted area as prescribed 
by Section 3652 of the city ordinances or that the city 
had a discretion in permitting such sales, which discre-
tion was being arbitrarily employed. 
We agree with the trial court in its memorandum 
opinion that the city fathers hav,e no right to permit 
any person to violate the law but the authorities hold 
that the mere lax enforcement of a law or ordinance 
violates no constitutional right. 
The Wade oas,e, sup'fia, also holds tha:t where mere 
laxity of enforcement, although it may result in the un-
equal application of the law to those who are entitled 
to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection 
in the constitutional sense, it must be shown that there 
was an intentional discrimination, which of course must 
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be pleaded. Dillon on IJ!unicipal Corporations (3rd Ed.) 
Sec. 327 states as follows: 
'' \Yhether or not a municipal ordinance is 
discriminating, must be determined by the court 
as a question of law from the provisions of the 
ordinance itself and not from the manner of its 
enforcement.'' 
In the case of City ·of Denver v. Gira.r:d, 42 Pac. 662, 
the court said : 
''The ordinance in question is not void be-
cause it conflicts with a prior ordinance relating 
to the same subject, and it is equally clear that 
it is not unreasonable merely because the muni-
cipal authorities have been lax in impartially en-
forcing it, or had not, at the time of the trial, 
instituted suits against other violators of its pro-
visions.'' 
Also see Sylvartia v. Hilton, 51 S. W. 744, 2 L.R.A. 
N.S. 483, wherein the court said: 
''If the meaning of an ordinance is plain 
and unambiguous, the fact that it may have been 
repeatedly violated without objection on the part 
of the municipal officers will not alter its mean-
ing, or furnish any defense to one who afterwards 
violates it." 
CONCLUSION 
The complaint of the appellant fails to staie facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the order 
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of the trial court in sustaining the g,eneral demurrer, 
and its further order dismissing the complaint of appel-
lant should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
C~try Att;orrney, 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assistarn.t City Attorneys. 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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